Post-Quantum Crypto: Challenges for Embedded Applications

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
POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY CONFERENCE 2023 NOVEMBER 8, 2023 - AMSTERDAM



SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD

PUBLIC

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HOW TO PREPARE FOR HURRICANE SEASON Quantum



MAKE A PLAN

Airmen should create an emergency plan and/or checklist

- obtain supplies
- undate personal documents
- secure household
- research evacuation options/route
- update prescription



CREATE A GO-BAG

Prepare supplies ahead of a hurricane. These can include

- Additional clothes
- Personal documents
- Travel supplies
- Prescriptions



KNOW YOUR WING GUIDANCE

Whether preparing for a hurricane or evacuating know your wing or installation's guidance. Routinely check for updates from leadership and maintain communication with your chain of command.



RECOGNIZE WARNINGS & ALERTS

Have several ways to receive alerts. Download real-time alert apps. Sign up for community alerts in your area and be aware of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) and Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA). which requires no-sign up.



STAY SAFE

Practice good hygiene and safety measures during any pa of a hurricane evacuation or impact. Keep family considerations in mind and don't be afriad to contact eadership for auidance.

POST-QUANTUM CRYPTO FOR EMBEDDED DEVICES?

Outline

Risk assessment: when to act?

Embedded perspective

- PQC performance
- High-assurance implementations





HOW TO PREPARE FOR HURRICANE SEASON Quantum



MAKE A PLAN



CREATE A GO-BAG



KNOW YOUR WING GUIDANCE




RECOGNIZE WARNINGS & ALERTS



STAY SAFE

PQC STANDARDS - NIST



CRYSTALS-Dilithium

Falcon

SPHINCS+

Secondary **Winners**

HQC

BIKE

Classic McEliece

SIKE

Round 4 **Candidates**


Proposals June '23: 40 "complete & proper" submissions

Digital Signature Competition

2024

2025?

· 2028?






Winners

PQC Standard
(Key Exchange + Digital Signatures)

PQC Standard #2 (Digital Signatures)







National Standards

- **USA.** NIST announces standards release of 4 PQC schemes ('24 '25). Additional standards to follow.
- EU. Push from EU for adding schemes to international standard. October '23: ISO to amend ISO/IEC 18033-2.
- ASIA. Selection of new schemes ongoing in both China/Korea.

Protocol Standards

- IETF: TLS, OpenPGP, hybrid keys, key serialization, encoding for signatures
- ISO/TC 68/SC 2/WG 11 (Encryption algorithms used in banking applications)
- ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 17/WG 4 (Cards and security devices for personal identification)

PQC MIGRATION GUIDANCE BY GOVERNMENTS



USA (NIST/NSA)

- NIST/NSA recommendation available
- Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0
- PQC FW signature recommended for new products after 2025
- PQC transition complete by 2030 using SW update



Germany (BSI)


- BSI first recommendation (English)
- BSI considerations (German)
- Expectation is that beginning of 2030s, a relevant quantum computer is available to be a threat for high-secure applications
- Quantum security: considers both PQC + QKD



France (ANSSI)

- PQC for security products "as soon as possible" when long-lasting (until 2030) protection is required
- Others to migrate to classic-PQC hybrid in 2025 2030
- Switch to PQC-only expected by 2030

WHY DO WE WANT TO PROTECT KYBER / DILITHIUM?







RUNNING PQC ON EMBEDDED DEVICES

Key sizes

Performance

Memory usage

What about high security implementation?





PQC ON EMBEDDED DEVICES

What is embedded?

NIST has recommended Arm Cortex-M4

Pqm4: Post-quantum crypto library for the ARM Cortex-M4, STM32F4DISCOVERY 196 KiB of RAM and 1 MiB of Flash ROM

Low-power Edge computing: LPC800 Series

- 8 to 60 MHz Cortex-M0+ core
- { 4, 8, 16 } KiB of SRAM
- { 16, 32 } KiB Flash


	Variant		Dilithium-3			
			KiB	10^3 cc		
C	PQClean [1]	K	59.4	3,504		
		S	77.7	12,987		
		V	56.4	3,666		
	New [2]	K	6.4	5,112		
		S	6.5	36,303		
		V	2.7	7,249		

^[1] M. J. Kannwischer, P. Schwabe, D. Stebila, and T. Wiggers: Improving Software Quality in Cryptography Standardization Projects. Security Standardization Research – EuroS&P Workshops. 2022.

^[2] J. W. Bos, J. Renes and A. Sprenkels: Dilithium for Memory Constrained Devices. Africacrypt, LNCS, vol. 13503, Springer, 2022.








DILITHIUM IMPACT

- Measurements on Cortex-M4 from pqm4 framework
- Functional implementation only (not hardened)
- Large trade-offs between stack and efficiency
- 80 ~ 90 percent of run-time
 in SHA-3





PQC SIGNATURE MIGRATION (EMBEDDED PERSPECTIVE)

Algorithm (Level 3)	PQ Secure?	Standard?	Efficient Signing?	Stateful?	Efficient Verify?	Need hybrid?	PK (Bytes)	Sig (Bytes)
ECC	No	FIPS 186	Yes	No	Yes	N/A	32 B	64 B
Dilithium	Yes	PQC (2024)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	1952 B	3293 B
Falcon (L5)	Yes	PQC (2024)	No	No	Yes	Yes	1793 B	1280 B
SPHINCS+	Yes	PQC (2024)	No	No	Yes	No	48 B	16224 B
LMS / XMSS	Yes	SP 800-208	Yes?	Yes	Yes	No	60 B	1744 B

FO-CALYPSE




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High-assurance implementations




Use meta-information to extract information about the key used in your target platform / product. Many powerful techniques:

fault injections, simple power analysis, differential power analysis, correlation power analysis, template attacks, higher-order correlation attacks, mutual information analysis, linear regression analysis, horizontal analysis, etc




High-assurance implementations



It took many years to find secure and fast protections for RSA + ECC → still cat-and-mouse game

What about Post-Quantum Cryptography?

FUJISAKI OKAMOTO TRANSFORM




Transform a scheme which achieves IND-CPA ("chosen plaintext attack") security to reach IND-CCA ("indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks") security

• Fujisaki, E. and Okamoto T., Secure integration of asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes, CRYPTO 1999 and JoC 2013

THE SCA PROBLEM OF THE FO-TRANSFORM

Attack 1: Chosen Plaintext


- Attacker inputs only valid ciphertexts
- Attack focuses on **CPA Decryption**, everything after (and including) P is public
- Only need to protect CPA Decryption



THE SCA PROBLEM OF THE FO-TRANSFORM

Attack 2: Chosen Ciphertext

- Attacker inputs specially-crafted invalid ciphertexts
- Attack focuses on **CPA Decryption** + everything after (and including) P is potentially sensitive
- Potentially all (or most) modules need to be hardened





THE SCA PROBLEM OF THE FO-TRANSFORM



Why is it bad?

~

Millions of Points of Interest (Pol)

~

Easy to build templates

Masked Kyber is broken with only 15k traces.

Curse of Re-encryption: A Generic Power/EM Analysis on Post-Quantum KEMs


Rei Ueno^{1,2,3}, Keita Xagawa⁴, Yutaro Tanaka^{1,2}, Akira Ito^{1,2}, Junko Takahashi⁴ and Naofumi Homma^{1,2}

CASE STUDY: MASKED KYBER

Split variables into *d* shares.

Higher *d* = Higher security + Increased cost

Pre-Quantum: Certified industrial solutions **d = 2-3**



Number of Shares

CASE STUDY: MASKED KYBER

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Higher *d* = Higher security + Increased cost

Pre-Quantum: Certified industrial solutions **d = 2-3**

For **low noise**:


- Known ciphertext \rightarrow d = 6
- Chosen ciphertext → d = 8

FO leakage causes an increase of **2** shares.

For high(er) noise:

- Known ciphertext \rightarrow d = 2
- Chosen ciphertext → d = 3

FO leakage causes an increase of **1** share.





CONCLUSIONS

<u>Irrelevant</u> if the quantum threat is real or not New PQC-Standard are coming!

→ Post-quantum crypto is already being requested by customers in all areas including Industrial, IoT and Automotive!

For embedded platforms challenges in terms of

- Performance, memory and key-sizes
- How to efficiently achieve protection against sophisticated side-channel attacks?

- ✓ Think about migration paths now
- ✓ Exciting times to work on crypto & security solutions!



