



# (Embedded) Post-Quantum Cryptography

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Green Village, Nieuwegein

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


# Agenda

- Quantum Computing
- Post-Quantum Cryptography
- Standards
- Migration
- Awareness

# Contemporary Cryptography

## TLS-ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256



# How IBM's new five-qubit universal quantum computer works

IBM achieves

CHRIS LEE - 5/4



NEWS | 23 October 2019

## Hello quantum world! Google's quantum performance

## Intel Delivers 17-Qubit Superconducting Chip with Advanced Packaging to QCTech

### Development Roadmap

IBM Quantum



# Quantum Computing

Computer systems and algorithms based on principles of quantum mechanics


- Superposition
- Interference
- Entanglement

- A classical bit can only be in the state corresponding to 0 or the state corresponding to 1
- A qubit may be in a superposition of both states  
→ when measured it is always 0 or 1

## Shor's quantum algorithm (1994).

Polynomial-time algorithm to factor integers.

**Impact.** If we assume the availability of a large quantum computer, then one can break RSA instantly.



## State-of-the-art.

IBM's 127-Qubit Quantum Processor


## Break RSA-3072:

~10,000 qubits are needed


# Contemporary cryptography

TLS-~~ECDHE-RSA~~-AES256-GCM-SHA384

“Double” the key sizes



# Post-quantum versus quantum crypto





# Quantum Potential to Destroy Security as we know it

## **Confidential email messages, private documents, and financial transactions**

Secure today but could be compromised in the future, even if encrypted

## **Firmware update mechanisms in vehicles**

Could be circumvented and allow dangerous modifications

## **Critical industrial and public service infrastructure (for healthcare, utilities, and transportation using internet and virtual private networks)**

Could become exposed – potentially destabilize cities

## **Audit trails and digitally signed documents associated with safety (auto certification and pharmaceutical authorizations)**

Could be retrospectively modified

## **The integrity of blockchains**

Could be retrospectively compromised – could include fraudulent manipulation of ledger and cryptocurrency transactions





# PQC Migration Drivers

## Standards




NIST



## Crypto Agility


PQC RoT





Secure updates



## Store now decrypt later




TLS 1.3





**Post-Quantum Crypto Standards Are Coming**  
**It doesn't matter if you believe in quantum computers or not**

# Post-Quantum Crypto Standardization






# Algorithm selection

Key Exchange

Digital signature



# PQC Migration guidance by governments



## USA (NIST/NSA)

- [NIST/NSA recommendation](#) available
- Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0
- PQC FW signature recommended for new products after 2025
- PQC transition complete by 2030 using SW update



## Germany (BSI)

- [BSI first recommendation](#) (English)
- [BSI considerations](#) (German)
- Expectation is that beginning of 2030s, a relevant quantum computer is available to be a threat for high-secure applications
- Quantum security: considers both PQC + QKD




## France (ANSSI)


- PQC for security products “as soon as possible” when long-lasting (until 2030) protection is required
- Others to migrate to classic-PQC hybrid in 2025 – 2030
- Switch to PQC-only expected by 2030



# PQC Migration: USA



# Impact of PQC on embedded eco-system



Data collection, processing and decisions at the edge  
Devices securely connected to the cloud

## No Silver Bullet

If a crypto scheme was better, we would have standardized this already

## Cryptographic Keys

Orders of magnitude larger.  
In the final: up to 1.3MB  
Winners: up to 4.8KB  
(ECC: 32 bytes, RSA: 384 bytes)

## Performance

Varies: some faster some significantly slower.  
SHA-3 is a dominating component (~80%)

## Memory

Orders of magnitude more: up 100KB memory of RAM when executing

## Bandwidth & Power

Larger signatures (up to 4.6KB) → more bandwidth required → increase in power usage



# Conclusions

- Standardized PQC will be everywhere in the very near future
- Migration to PQC is a difficult & hot topic, particularly in embedded environments
- Many practical challenges
  - Memory
  - Available hardware (co-processors)
  - Efficient side-channel countermeasures

For some scenarios with more powerful end devices:

- ✓ Large key sizes no issue, marginal increase in stack usage
- SHA-3 performance crucial, hardware acceleration important
- Little impact on OTA time for updates
- ✓ Transition to PQC practical right now



# Get in touch

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