


# (Embedded) Post-Quantum Cryptography

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Technical Director, CCC&S, CTO June 2024

Annual Day (Jaardag) 2024: Cybersecurity fit for the future Green Village, Nieuwegein

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




# Agenda

- Quantum Computing
- Post-Quantum Cryptography
- Standards
- Migration
- Awareness

## **Contemporary Cryptography** TLS-ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256



OUANTUM CLOUD -How IBM's new five-qubit universal quan Intel Delivers 17-Qubit Superconducting Chip with Advanced computer works NEWS 23 October 2019 Dackaging to OuTach IBM achiev Hello quantum world! Goc Eagle's quantum performance Development Roadmap **IBM Quantum** 2016-2019 2020 @ 2021 • 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2033 +Run quantum circuits Release multi-Enhancing quantum Bring dynamic Enhancing quantum Enhancing quantum Improving quantum Improving quantum Beyond 2033, quantum-Improving quantum Improving quantum Improving quantum on the IBM Quantum Platform dimensional execution speed by circuits to unlock execution speed by circuit quality and execution speed and circuit quality to circuit quality to circuit quality to circuit quality to centric supercomputers roadmap publicly 100x with Qiskit more computations 5x with quantum speed to allow 5K parallelization with allow 7.5K gates allow 10K gates allow 15K gates allow 100M gates will include 1000's of partitioning and with initial aim Runtime serverless and logical qubits unlocking gates with focused on scaling Execution modes parametric circuits quantum modularity the full power of quantum computing Platform **Data Scientist** Specific Libraries Code assistant Mapping Collection General purpose OC libraries Middleware Researchers Diskit Runtime Quantum Physicist OASM3 IBM Quantum Experience Dynamic circuits Execution Modes Heron (5K) Flamingo (5K) Flamingo (7.5K) Flamingo (10K) Flamingo (15K) rror Mitigation **Error Mitigation** Error Mitigation Early 7.5k gates ik gates 10k gates 15k gates 133 gubits 156 qubits 156 gubits 156 gubits 156 qubits Benchmarking Benchmarking Penguin Classical modular Quantum modular Quantum modular Quantum modula Quantum modular 156x7 = 1092 qubits 156x7 = 1092 qubit 156x7 = 1092 qubits 156x7 = 1092 qubit N) The Sycamore chip is composed of 54 qubits, each made of superconducting


# **Quantum Computing**

Computer systems and algorithms based on principles of quantum mechanics

- Superposition
- Interference
- Entanglement
- A classical bit can only be in the state corresponding to 0 or the state corresponding to 1
- A qubit may be in a superposition of both states → when measured it is always 0 or 1

### Shor's quantum algorithm (1994).

Polynomial-time algorithm to factor integers. Impact. If we assume the availability of a large quantum computer, then one can break RSA instantly.




State-of-the-art.

IBM's 127-Qubit Quantum Processor Break RSA-3072:


~10,000 qubits are needed

# Contemporary cryptography TLS-ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384

# "Double" the key sizes




# Post-quantum versus quantum crypto




Quantum Potential to Destroy Security as we know it Confidential email messages, private documents, and financial transactions Secure today but could be compromised in the future, even if encrypted Firmware update mechanisms in vehicles Could be circumvented and allow dangerous modifications Critical industrial and public service infrastructure (for healthcare, utilities, and transportation using internet and virtual private networks) Could become exposed – potentially destabilize cities Audit trails and digitally signed documents associated with safety (auto certification and pharmaceutical authorizations) Could be retrospectively modified The integrity of blockchains Could be retrospectively compromised - could include fraudulent manipulation of ledger and cryptocurrency transactions

# **PQC Migration Drivers**











It doesn't matter if you believe in quantum computers or not





# **Algorithm selection**

Key Exchange Digital signature



# PQC Migration guidance by governments



### USA (NIST/NSA)

- NIST/NSA recommendation available
- Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0
- PQC FW signature recommended for new products after 2025
- PQC transition complete by 2030 using SW update



### Germany (BSI)


- BSI first recommendation (English)
- <u>BSI considerations</u> (German)
- Expectation is that beginning of 2030s, a relevant quantum computer is available to be a threat for high-secure applications
- Quantum security: considers both PQC + QKD




### France (ANSSI)

- PQC for security products "as soon as possible" when long-lasting (until 2030) protection is required
- Others to migrate to classic-PQC hybrid in 2025 2030
- Switch to PQC-only expected by 2030

# **PQC Migration: USA**



# Impact of PQC on embedded eco-system



Data collection, processing and decisions at the edge Devices securely connected to the cloud

### **No Silver Bullet**

If a crypto scheme was better, we would have standardized this already

### **Cryptographic Keys**

Orders of magnitude larger.

In the final: up to 1.3MB

Winners: up to 4.8KB

(ECC: 32 bytes, RSA: 384 bytes)

### **Performance**

Varies: some faster some significantly slower. SHA-3 is a dominating component (~80%)

### Memory

Orders of magnitude more: up 100KB memory of RAM when executing

### **Bandwidth & Power**

Larger signatures (up to 4.6KB) → more bandwidth required → increase in power usage



# **Conclusions**

- Standardized PQC will be everywhere in the very near future
- Migration to PQC is a difficult & hot topic, particularly in embedded environments
- Many practical challenges
  - Memory
  - Available hardware (co-processors)
  - Efficient side-channel countermeasures

For some scenarios with more powerful end devices:

- √ Large key sizes no issue, marginal increase in stack usage
- SHA-3 performance crucial, hardware acceleration important
- Little impact on OTA time for updates
- √ Transition to PQC practical right now



# Get in touch

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